tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post7069414277025805096..comments2023-07-12T16:07:37.360+01:00Comments on Philosophy of...: Colin McGinn on the limits of explanationTomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18283940823159124589noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-17430011654003894702013-04-01T15:08:42.719+01:002013-04-01T15:08:42.719+01:00In the western movie "The Outlaw Josie Wales&...In the western movie "The Outlaw Josie Wales" the aging but vigorous indian Lone Watie pulls out a coloured transparent crystaline chunk and says "l have this rock candy - but it is not for eating - it is for looking through"<br />I should think that Mr. McGinn is correct in proposing cognitive closure - a rather obvious conclusion if we assume isolated brain/minds as the effective cognitive agents. But we do not know where the limits of our brain/mind lies - and therefore we do not know where our epistemological limits lie - so pessimism is the correct term I think - in other words an attitude adopted in the absence of compelling evidence either way.<br />He may well be right that the 'hard problem' will never be solved -but I think philosophical problems can sometimes act in a similar way to artworks - or to Lone Watie's candy - to help us see things from a different perspective. Sometimes a problem is not for solving - rather for provoking.<br />The observation that the 'mind body' problem has not been 'solved' in the last few thousand years holds little water for me -the problem (if we can call it that) is epistemological - about how and what we can know about consciousness. All epistemological systems have both meriological articulations and aspectual filters/generators. Once a filter/generator has been posited then the possible articulation afforded by it is in principle closed - this is the province of logic in its widest sense - the province of discovery and empirical settling - but I see no limit on the number of possible aspects that can be adopted - this is the province of creativity or to use a less coloured term - generativity. So who is to say what the next thousand years will produce - or the next ten years come to that.<br />EyeBoomerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07744296297449094660noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-68269804927793148892012-10-19T10:50:39.150+01:002012-10-19T10:50:39.150+01:00What if mind is non-algorithmic? All phys...What if mind <a href="http://seanrobsville.blogspot.com/2009/10/non-algorithmic-phenomena.html" rel="nofollow"> is non-algorithmic? </a> All physicalist explanations are <a href="http://rational-buddhism.blogspot.com/2012/02/church-turing-deutsch-principle-and.html" rel="nofollow"> by their very nature algorithmic, </a> so attempting a physical/computational/ procedural/quantitative/Boolean explanation for non-algorithmic mind would be a category error.<br /><br />Non-algorithmic phenomena (if they exist) present a profound challenge to science, because some/most/all of <a href="http://rational-buddhism.blogspot.com/2012/09/buddhism-and-mathematics.html" rel="nofollow"> the basic algorithmic operations and data structures </a> may not be relevant or applicable to any 'reductionist' explanation. <br /><br />AND may not be applicable<br /><br />NOT may not be applicable<br /><br />OR may not be applicable<br /><br />IF... THEN... (and its reverse aspect 'because' ) may not be applicable<br /><br />Numbers and logical states may not be applicable<br /><br />The great 'mysterian' difficulty in talking about non-algorithmic phenomena is that although we might be able to say in general terms what they do, it is impossible by their very nature to describe how they do it. (If we could describe in a stepwise manner what was going on, then the phenomenon would be algorithmic!).<br /><br />So what phenomena would be applicable in the non-algorithmic realms? Qualia? Intentionality? Introspection? seanrobsvillehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01135048988031819619noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-69433972078505644012012-10-13T00:17:51.876+01:002012-10-13T00:17:51.876+01:00Indeed. I believe Kant has properly shown that suc...Indeed. I believe Kant has properly shown that such a link does not necessarily exist, e.g., our (futile) attempts of determining the existence of God on the basis of speculative reason. McGinn's view on this matter is identical to mine.ignoramu5noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-35631289053036820282012-10-12T02:40:32.634+01:002012-10-12T02:40:32.634+01:00Perhaps; but I don't see any reason why we sho...Perhaps; but I don't see any reason why we should think that an ability for being X to formulate/express a problem should have any bearing on X's ability to solve that problem. Whats the link?Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18283940823159124589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-27620527643210974512012-10-12T02:38:32.494+01:002012-10-12T02:38:32.494+01:00PS, 'Transcendental Naturalism' is McGinn&...PS, 'Transcendental Naturalism' is McGinn's own expression. 'New Mysterianism' is not McGinn's term; rather it is a term that originates from his opponents who seek to criticize his view.Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18283940823159124589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-10089320085676296032012-10-12T02:37:37.836+01:002012-10-12T02:37:37.836+01:00This is very wrong. There are a whole host of posi...This is very wrong. There are a whole host of positions in the philosophy of mind concerning consciousness, of which the identity thesis (that mental states are identical to neurophysiological states) is just one. But there is also non-reductive physicalism, as well as eliminative physicalism. So if you reject the identity thesis, you can still be a physicalist.<br /><br />Furthermore, McGinn is not at all committed to dualism. His view is naturalistic, but he places our inability to understand the mind at an epistemological, NOT an ontological level. One of the virtues of his view is that it is compatible with both physicalism and dualism.<br /><br />The Dennett criticism has more weight. I have no view on that matter.Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18283940823159124589noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-38905295129875322922012-10-12T01:53:38.623+01:002012-10-12T01:53:38.623+01:00My complaint with this view is that, while we may ...My complaint with this view is that, while we may indeed have cognitive limitations, problems formulated within our means seem like they should have solutions that themselves lie within those same means. <br /><br />Sure, slugs can't solve mathematical theorems, but they can't conjecture them either. <br /><br />So to for us; if we can formulate the problem of consciousness, shouldn't we at least suspect we could solve it?Peterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14256561096086248821noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-51434078554973066502012-10-11T20:31:12.079+01:002012-10-11T20:31:12.079+01:00Here's a response to McGinn's Mysterianism...Here's a response to McGinn's Mysterianism (what you call Transcendental Naturalism) copied (with citation) from The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. This excerpt is from one chapter in particular authored by Uriah Kriegel (page 38):<br /><br />The Case Against Mysterianism:<br /><br />"McGinn appears to assume that conscious states are caused by brain states. His argument does not go through if conscious states are simply identical to brain states. In other words, the argument does not go through unless any identity of conscious states with brain states is rejected. But such rejection amounts to dualism. McGinn is thus committed to dualism. On the view he presupposes, the conscious cannot be simply identified with the physical. Rather, there are two different kinds of states a person or organism may be in: brain states on the one hand and conscious states on the other. <br /><br />Recall that McGinn's mysterianism is of the epistemological variety. The epistemological claim now appears to be conditional upon an ontological claim, namely dualism. So at the end of the day, as far as the ontology of consciousness is concerned, McGinn is a straightforward dualist. The plausibility of his (epistemological) mysterianism depends, to that extent, on the plausibility of (ontological) dualism."<br /><br />So before accepting McGinn's arguments we must consider the plausibility of dualism, and I do not think that THAT debate has been resolved in the least. <br /><br />"Let us raise one more difficulty for mysterianism, and in particular the notion of cognitive closure. It is, of course, undeniable that rats do not understand trigonometry. But observe that trigonometric problems do not pose themselves to rats (Dennet, 1995, pp. 381-383). Indeed, it is precisely because rats do not understand trigonometry that trigonometric problems do not pose themselves to rats. For rats to grapple with trigonometric problems, they would have to understand quite a bit of trigonometry. Arguably, it is a mark of genuine cognitive closure that certain questions do not even pose themselves to the cognitively closed. The fact that certain questions about consciousness do pose themselves to humans may therefore indicate that humans are not cognitively closed to consciousness (or more accurately the link between consciousness and the brain)."<br /><br />Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (2007) (Eds: Zelazo, Moscovitch and Thompson)<br />Chapter 3: Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives, by Uriah KriegelTom Rochahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05016377994672641523noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-355937947221948748.post-23064914673255852022012-10-11T15:53:31.023+01:002012-10-11T15:53:31.023+01:00Nice article!
I'd be inclined to disagree, bu...Nice article!<br /><br />I'd be inclined to disagree, but I'm a scientist, so what do i know?<br /><br />Argument:<br />as the progess of mathematics is basically the enlargement of the space of methods and structures of conceivable systems. Although no one can concieve of something which they can not concieve, the fact that this space is growing (mathematicians are quite good at their jobs) presuades me that it is possible.<br /><br />I'd lay bets that when someone figures out how concioussness works, the logic used will be ancient, and the maths will be over 50 years old.<br /><br />it's pretty much impossible to concieve of all of the things that allow this message to reach you from my brain at the same time, but its mostly 'understood' what is going on (subject to physic's terms and conditions.)Jeremy Adcockhttp://www.leekspin.com/noreply@blogger.com